Below is the online expanded version of a shorter paper, which was submitted to the European Conference on Digital Government - 2019.
___
Israeli Central Election Committee and the 2019 election – an e-government case study
Joseph Zernik, PhD
Human Rights Alert NGO, Tel-Aviv, Israel
joseph.zernik@hra-ngo.org
Abstract: UN Human Rights Council and academic reports have repeatedly documented lack of integrity in e-government in Israel, undermining Human Rights and democratic institutions. In the context of the recent April 2019 general election and the upcoming Sep 2019 election, review is provided of conduct of the Central Election Committee [CEC], with special focus on IT system development, implementation and operation. Our research in this area goes a couple of years back, and results are based on online data review, FOIA procedures, State Ombudsman reports, communications with Shin-Bet, and observation of the April 2019 general election. Starting in 2007 the State Ombudsman reports document serious failures, related to development and implementation of the CEC’s “Democracy” system. Following the 2015 general election, the system has been repeatedly alleged as a tool for election fraud. State Ombudsman reports following the 2013 and 2015 general elections document ongoing critical integrity and security failures (no log of entries), which the CEC failed to address. Starting 2017, CEC – chaired by a Supreme Court justice – provided a series of false and misleading FOIA responses. E.g., CEC stated that the Shin-Bet provided the required validation and certification of “Democracy” system. Shin-Bet flatly denied such assertion. E.g., CEC refused to provide the names of any persons, who were authorized and permitted to publish election outcome online. Instead, it misrepresented the publication as an automated process. In January 2019, a closed meeting was held with CEC Chair Justice Melcer, senior INSS/ Shin-Bet officers, cyber security, State Ombudsman and Ministry of Justice experts to evaluate threats to the upcoming April 09th, 2019 election. Shin-Bet experts warned against cyber threats by foreigners. Others warned against provocations, e.g., fake news by main Israeli political actors, and against lack of integrity in CEC’s conduct and its “Democracy” system. The April 09, 2019 general election was marked by widespread incidents by the ruling Likud party, deliberately intended to suppress Arab voting, and possibly to incite violence (violence failed to erupt). The 24-48 hours following the election documented massive failures, e.g., voter turnouts in the hundreds of percents in certain polling stations, which seemed to parallel certain sectoral lines. Other real time online publication errors persisted, repeatedly excused by CEC as “data entry” errors. Small pandemonium took place at the counting hall. By April 30th, the 21st Knesset was sworn in, but in early July it was determined that a counting error required shifting of one mandate between parties. Widespread voting fraud and lack of integrity in CEC paper documents was alleged. The common feature of electronic and paper records and systems is lack of validity and integrity, vague and ambiguous authenticity. The distinction between authentic and fake records can never be unequivocally made. The April election outcome failed to generate a ruling coalition, resulting in an unprecedented decision to run another general election in September 2019, with an interim government in between, circumstances described by some “a constitutional crisis” (in a nation with no constitution)… Both elections are largely shadowed by the Prime Minister’s pending indictments on bribery, deceit, breach of trust. Under circumstances where the political and justice systems are corrupt, one cannot expect integrity of e-government systems. On the contrary, under such circumstances e-government systems are easily amenable and likely to be manipulated as instruments of deceit.
Keywords: Central Election Committee, Courts, Shin-Bet, corruption, “Democracy” IT system
1. Introduction
Previous UN Human Rights Council (2013, 2018) and academic reports [i] have repeatedly documented lack of integrity in e-government in Israel, undermining Human Rights and democratic institutions. In particular, the 2018 UN Human Rights Council High Commissioner’s Report adopted the Human Rights Alert NGO [HRA-NGO] submission, incorporated it in reference into the final report, and summed it as follows: [ii]___
Israeli Central Election Committee and the 2019 election – an e-government case study
Joseph Zernik, PhD
Human Rights Alert NGO, Tel-Aviv, Israel
joseph.zernik@hra-ngo.org
Abstract: UN Human Rights Council and academic reports have repeatedly documented lack of integrity in e-government in Israel, undermining Human Rights and democratic institutions. In the context of the recent April 2019 general election and the upcoming Sep 2019 election, review is provided of conduct of the Central Election Committee [CEC], with special focus on IT system development, implementation and operation. Our research in this area goes a couple of years back, and results are based on online data review, FOIA procedures, State Ombudsman reports, communications with Shin-Bet, and observation of the April 2019 general election. Starting in 2007 the State Ombudsman reports document serious failures, related to development and implementation of the CEC’s “Democracy” system. Following the 2015 general election, the system has been repeatedly alleged as a tool for election fraud. State Ombudsman reports following the 2013 and 2015 general elections document ongoing critical integrity and security failures (no log of entries), which the CEC failed to address. Starting 2017, CEC – chaired by a Supreme Court justice – provided a series of false and misleading FOIA responses. E.g., CEC stated that the Shin-Bet provided the required validation and certification of “Democracy” system. Shin-Bet flatly denied such assertion. E.g., CEC refused to provide the names of any persons, who were authorized and permitted to publish election outcome online. Instead, it misrepresented the publication as an automated process. In January 2019, a closed meeting was held with CEC Chair Justice Melcer, senior INSS/ Shin-Bet officers, cyber security, State Ombudsman and Ministry of Justice experts to evaluate threats to the upcoming April 09th, 2019 election. Shin-Bet experts warned against cyber threats by foreigners. Others warned against provocations, e.g., fake news by main Israeli political actors, and against lack of integrity in CEC’s conduct and its “Democracy” system. The April 09, 2019 general election was marked by widespread incidents by the ruling Likud party, deliberately intended to suppress Arab voting, and possibly to incite violence (violence failed to erupt). The 24-48 hours following the election documented massive failures, e.g., voter turnouts in the hundreds of percents in certain polling stations, which seemed to parallel certain sectoral lines. Other real time online publication errors persisted, repeatedly excused by CEC as “data entry” errors. Small pandemonium took place at the counting hall. By April 30th, the 21st Knesset was sworn in, but in early July it was determined that a counting error required shifting of one mandate between parties. Widespread voting fraud and lack of integrity in CEC paper documents was alleged. The common feature of electronic and paper records and systems is lack of validity and integrity, vague and ambiguous authenticity. The distinction between authentic and fake records can never be unequivocally made. The April election outcome failed to generate a ruling coalition, resulting in an unprecedented decision to run another general election in September 2019, with an interim government in between, circumstances described by some “a constitutional crisis” (in a nation with no constitution)… Both elections are largely shadowed by the Prime Minister’s pending indictments on bribery, deceit, breach of trust. Under circumstances where the political and justice systems are corrupt, one cannot expect integrity of e-government systems. On the contrary, under such circumstances e-government systems are easily amenable and likely to be manipulated as instruments of deceit.
Keywords: Central Election Committee, Courts, Shin-Bet, corruption, “Democracy” IT system
1. Introduction
24. HRA-NGO highlighted the serious deterioration in integrity of law and justice agencies as a consequence of the implementation of e-government systems. It affirmed that the validity and integrity of any legal and judicial records of Israel should be deemed dubious at best.There is no electronic Voting with electronic voting machines in Israel. The balloting is conducted purely on paper, counted by local Ballot Station Committees. The outcomes are entered and compounded through the central “Democracy” e-government system,
2. April 09, 2019: Election day and its aftermath
On the morning after election day, activists posted the ballot station outcomes from the CEC web site, showing voter turnout in Jewish settlements in Palestine, ranging between 97 and 173%. In response, later in the day, the Central Election Committee issued an explanatory note to media: “data entry errors" [iii] Such errors persisted on the following days, prompting widespread criticism from all sides of the political system, regarding incompetence of the CEC.
3. Other unusual incidents surrounding the April 2019 general election and its aftermath
Figure 4. Keizler Inbar PR firm post, showing the two partners with the Netanyahus, boasting - “shhh, don’t tell anybody. We did it...” - a successful, secretive, "amazing logistic" operation, in collaboration with PM Netanyahu, in which cameras were planted in Arab ballot stations, "preventing thousands of forgeries", producing “voter turnout lower than 50%, the lowest in recent years!” [iv]
___
As
part of deliberate Arab voter suppression efforts, and possibly
expecting to incite violence, Netanyahu's Likud party hired some
1,200 people to go with body cameras to ballot stations in Arab
population centers, claiming that Arabs were notorious for voter
fraud. [v,vi,vii]
The were some speculations that it was intended to incite violence.
4. January 2019: “Fake Election” - threat assessment meeting at the Israeli Democracy Institute
____
In the January 2019 meeting, former senior Shin-Bet officers, currently at INSS (Institute for National Security Studies) reviewed threats related to “election in a complex cyber environment”. Threats were attributed to Russians, Chinese, Iranians and others. Similar concerns, regarding foreign cyber attacks against the general election were repeatedly published by Israeli media. [ix]
“Constitutional” (in a nation with no constitution) concerns were also raised, regarding the appropriate assignment of authority and responsibility for CEC cyber security.
Senior legal experts expressed their position that the main threat to integrity of the election was from “fake news”, generated on election day and rapidly propagated through social networks, using “fake profiles” and “bot-nets”.
It was noted that current CEC and cyber security legal framework failed to adequately address many, or most of the related issues.
Such experts noted that on the 2015 election day, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself spread such “fake news” through Facebook – that “left-wing NGOs” were busing Arabs, who were “voting by droves”. [x] The same legal experts noted that such conduct could have been addressed through existing law, pertaining to fraud and election fraud. Concomitantly, such experts noted that the law and justice system avoided any enforcement in such matters.
Some of the same legal experts had tried to promote quick legislation to prohibit some of the clearest methods of manipulation and abuse of social networks (e.g., micro-targeting) in an effort to pervert the election. When that failed, they had tried to broker a voluntary agreement among the parties in such matters. They noted that in both cases, all parties supported the initiatives, except for the ruling Likud party. It was clear that the Likud party had the best cyber infrastructure, the best funding. Therefore, suspicions were raised the Likud party was planning some cyber deception for election day.
Others (such as this author) noted, in the presence of CEC Chair, Justice Hanan Melcer, that lack of integrity in CEC conduct and in particular invalidity of its IT systems, were cardinal threats to integrity of the election.
Another threat was noted - the tight relationship between the current Israeli government and security apparatus-related, government-regulated Israeli cyber firms, which were notorious for their expertise in perverting social network public discourse, general elections, civil society organizations (Psy Group, Wikistrat, and Black Cube), [xi] as well was other possibly criminal actions. [xii,xiii]
In January 2019 it was also published that Shin-Bet initiated, for the first time ever, background and security clearance investigations of CEC personnel. [xiv]
4. FOIA requests and responses
Until 2016, the CEC held itself exempt from FOIA. Only after a special amendment to the Act, CEC was held obligated by the Act. However, even then, the Committee at times failed to respond, unless pre-litigation warnings were forwarded to the CEC Chair, Supreme Court Justice Hanan Melcer. [xv]
4.1 IT systems validation and certification by a State employee
FOIA request sought an authentic record, duly signed by a State employee. The Committee failed to provide such record. Instead, the Committee provided false statements - "the systems were validated and certified by the Agency [RE'EM-Shin-Bet - jz]". However, following flat denial by the Shin-Bet, the Committee stated that it did not have the required validation and certification by a State employee.
Figure
6. Top - the Committee's FOIA response
falsely stated that "the Agency [Re'em- Shin-Bet- jz] validated
and certified the Committee's IT systems". Bottom
- the Shin-Bet flatly denied such claims, "Shin-Bet is not
the guiding authority for the Committee, and therefore it is not the
certifying agency for its IT systems either".
___
4.2 Lawful appointment of CTO/IT Director
In FOIA response, pertaining to validation and certification of
“Democracy” system, CEC failed to provide the requested records,
but stated that Mr Lazar Dudovich supervised and certified all
aspects of development, implementation and operation of the system.
2. Mr Lazar Dudovich is a CEC employee, in charge of development and
maintenance [of its IT systems], serving as Chief of Operations and
Computing in CEC.
3. All planning, documentation, execution and maintenance of the
[“Democracy”] system, followed MAFTAH protocols [Israeli gov IT
development, implementation and operation protocols] under
supervision and certification by Chief of Operations and Computing –
Mr Lazar Dudovich.
___
However, in response to a follow-up FOIA request, no record was found of Mr Lazar Dudovich’s lawful appointment and his job description.
4.3 Authorities and permissions
In
response on FOIA request regarding persons, who hold authorities and
permissions to post election outcomes in the Committee's web site -
the Committee initially provided a false response, attempting to
generate false representation that it was a fully automated, no human
touch process, "...the results are published in a mechanized
manner"... However, following presentation to the Committee of
false election outcome data, which had been posted in the Committee's
web site, the Committee stated that someone uploaded the wrong data
file…
___
4.4
Compliance with lawfully binding IT system security
standards
In
response on FOIA request, the Committee stated that it had no
certification of compliance with IT security standards, required by
Israeli law.
4.5
Duly made protocols of Presidency and Plenary CEC meetings
The
Committee finally admitted in response to FOIA requests, dragged for
over a year, that it did not maintained signed minutes of its
Presidency and Plenary meetings, chaired by Supreme Court justices.
In contrast, the Committee did maintain lawfully signed minutes for
sub-committee meetings, chaired by other officials, e.g., the Tender
Committee and Tender Exception Committee. In a follow-up FOIA
request, the Committee was asked to provide copies of any document,
signed by then Committee Chairs, Supreme Court Justice Elyakim
Rubinstein, certifying the 2013 election outcome, Supreme Court
Justice Salim Joubran, certifying the 2015 election outcome. The
Committee issued an extension notice at the end of the legally
prescribed 30 day period, stating it could not respond in time, due
to work overload…
At the end of 10 months (time limit by law is 30 days, with a
possible 30 day extension), and after a pre-litigation notice, sent
last week to the Committee's Chair, Supreme Court Justice Hanan
Melcer, the Committee has finally responded on a FOIA request,
pertaining to protocols of the Committee's Presidency and Plenary
meetings (in which the Chair - Justice of the Supreme Court
presides). However, as was the case in previous FOIA responses, the
Committee's response failed to provide copies of the authentic
records. Instead, the Committee provided a letter, describing the
records... Regardless, the information relative to the agendas of the
Committee's Presidency and Plenary meetings , failed to show
involvement of the current Chair, Justice Hanan Melcer in material
issues, pertaining to validity, integrity and security of the
Committee's IT systems.
Similarly, a previous FOIA response denied the existence of any
records, which tied the Committee's chairs over the past 7 years to
computerization of the Committee.
In contrast, a November 2018 report by renowned Israeli columnist Ben
Caspit, under the Hebrew title, "Is the Israeli election
susceptible to fraud?", announced that Justice Melcer "delved
into the depth of the issue" and initiated " a
multi-layered security system". [xvi]
In a previous FOIA response, the Committee denied any relationship to
such report, or the existence of any records, which documented the
initiation of any corrective measures by Justice Melcer...
The Committee initially stated that the Shin-Bet validated and
certified its IT systems. However, after the Shin-Bet flatly refuted
such claims, the Committee stated that it had no validation and
certification records.
The Committee stated that it had no certification of compliance with
lawfully binding IT security standards.
In response, pertaining to authorities and permissions for publishing
the election outcome in the Committee's web site - the Committee
provided a response that was a false representation - of an
automated, no human touch process. After the Committee had been
presented with false election outcome data on its web site, the
Committee claimed that somebody uploaded the wrong data file...
The Committee's FOIA responses raise serious concerns regarding
integrity of the Committee's senior officers, including CEO -
Attorney Orly Adas, Legal Counsel - Attorney Dean Livneh, and FOIA
Officer - Elad Naveh. According to the Committee's FOIA responses,
management of the Committee's IT systems development, implementation
and operation is under the authority of Mr Lazar Dudovich - COO and
IT Director. However, the Committee failed to produce any record,
which documents his lawful appointment and job description...
Performance of the Committee's Chairs - justices of the Supreme Court
- fails to generate public trust…
Figure
9. The
Committee's initial FOIA response refused to provide any information
regarding the Committee's meetings, claiming that over the past 7
years it had held "innumerable meetings". Eventually it
turned out that over the past 4 years it has held only 12 meetings
(see below) ...
___
Figure 10. FOIA response, purporting to provide the
agenda pages of the Committee's Presidency and Plenum meetings since
the 2015 election (a total of 12).
___
Figure 11. FOIA response, purporting to provide the
agenda pages of the Committee's Presidency and Plenum meetings since
the March 2015 election and to January 02, 2019 - a total of 12
meetings. The Committee failed to provide the requested authentic
records, instead it provided a letter, which outlined the records.
___
4.6
Lawful certification of general election outcome
Given that CEC eventually admitted that there were no lawfully signed
Presidency or Plenary CEC meeting protocols, a follow-up FOIA request
asked for lawfully made records, certifying the outcome of the 2013,
2015, and April 2019 general election. No response is available yet.
4.7
Corrective measures
Following
repeat publication in wide distribution regarding critical failures
in the Committees validity, integrity and security, journalist Ben
Caspit published in November 2018 a report, titled, "Cyber
attacks increasingly penetrating Israel's politics" [the Hebrew
title was "Is the Israeli election susceptible to fraud?"].
The report announced that the Committee Chair - Justice Hanan Melcer,
" has already delved into the depths of the issue" and
initiated "the establishment of a multi-layer cyber protection
system". In response on another FOIA request, the Committee
denied any relationship to Caspit's report, and also denied the
existence of any records, which documented the initiation of any
corrective measures.
Figure 12 . November 2018 report by renowned Israeli columnist Ben Caspit. CEC denied any relationship or any knowledge of the facts reported by Capsit. Mr Caspit has failed to respond on repeat requests for comments on this matter.
5. 2015 general election -
allegations of computer fraud
Perennial concerns abound
regarding corruption of the CEC. [xvii]
Netanyahu’s win (at 23.40%) defied all up to the last minute
pollsters’ predictions, and it could be attributed to an unusual
increase in voting near the 22:00 closing time. Unlawful conduct in
the Committee’s IT system was alleged.
In a personal meeting, MK K
Elharrar, Chair of State Oversight Committee, commented on such
allegations: “Anything is possible.”
The allegations focus on
integrity and security of IT systems of the Central Election
Committee.
Figure 13. US
influential blog Daily Kos reported of concerns regarding fraud
several days after the 2015 Israeli general election. Similar reports
appeared later in Israel as well [xviii]
____
Figure 14. The number of voters in the last 2 hours of polling in successive election year [xix]
___
The Marker (business
supplement of the respectable Haaretz daily) published a series of
guest reports by Attorney David Levy, who claimed that serious fraud
was perpetrated in CEC IT systems in the 2015 general election.
According to his analysis, the fraud added to Netanyahu's Likud party
up to 8 mandates . In the 2015 national election, Netanyahu won,
according to the official count, thirty (30) mandates (out of 120 in
the Knesset -- Israeli parliament). The next biggest party was the
Labor party alliance, with 24 mandates. Therefore, the alleged fraud
entirely changed the political landscape in Israel.
According to Levy's analysis,
the fraud was perpetrated in the last couple of hours of the polling
day, by adding votes of people, who did not exercise their right to
vote. [xx]
Levy also filed a petition
with the Israeli Supreme Court, challenging the outcome of the 2015
general election. However, his petition was summarily dismissed for
lack of standing.
6.
2007-2015 State Ombudsman’s reports
Already
the 2007 State Ombudsman’s report found serious failures in conduct
of the CEC. Of particular interest are failures related to
unreasonable contracts with corporations involved in providing goods
and services, related to computerization of CEC. [xxi]
In
the aftermath, Knesset Chairperson Dalia Itzik announced her
intention to hold a hearing, aiming to evict the CEC from the
Knesset’s building, and “erase the stain of CEC”. [xxii]
The
2013 State Ombudsman’s report notes fundamental failures in
“Democracy” IT system, including apparent failure to maintain a
log of entries and failed entries to the system. Additionally, the
report states that no one was assigned the responsibility to review
the “Events Log” and investigate the “events” in the system.
Worse
yet, the 2015 State Ombudsman’s report notes that the failures,
which were noted in the 2013 report, relative to missing entry log
and failed entry events, and review of events, have not been
corrected, regardless of the 2013 audit report.
A failure of this type –
missing entry log, could not possibly happen in a system that was
developed and implemented following the binding State procedures and
State law, relative to organization IT systems and State IT systems.
It is inconceivable that a system, which was developed based on
written specifications, and which was validated prior to
implementation relative to such specifications, would demonstrate
such failures.
8. Discussion and conclusions
CEC
is a small government unit, headed by a Supreme Court justice. Its
conduct is critical for integrity, validity and legitimacy of the
regime. And yet, since 2007, State
Ombudsman’s reports repeatedly document incompetence and/or
corruption of the Israeli CEC. The
series of FOIA requests since
2016
likewise
demonstrates
CEC’s
determination
to undermine transparency of its conduct and
reflects
a culture of deceit
by CEC senior officers.
[xxiii]
Events
surrounding the April 2019 general election, likewise, document at
least CEC
incompetence.
The
circumstances surrounding the Israeli CEC and its IT systems may
appear inexplicable, given that Israel is self-advertised as a
hi-tech, start-up nation, a cyber superpower,
[xxiv]
now also a budding space
power - in February Israel
launched a spacecraft to the moon. [xxv]
However, already
the HRA-NGO submission for the 2018 UN Human Rights Commission
Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
of Israel (submitted
in July 2017) includes
a section reviewing evidence of lack of integrity in the CEC. [xxvi]
The submission recommended the invitation of international observers
for the next general election (which
eventually took place in April 2019).
The
HRA-NGO submission
also provides
extensive documentation of the effects of invalid,
fraudulent e-government
systems on
the nature of the regime, with particular
emphasis on corruption
of the justice system
and widespread abuse of
human
rights.
The HRA-NGO submission
was incorporated by reference into the 2018
UN Human
Rights High
Commissioner’s 2018
UPR report on
Israel, pursuant to
professional staff review, with
a note stating
- “the
validity and integrity of any legal and judicial records of Israel
should be deemed dubious at best.”
Obviously,
CEC
records are legal and judicial records.
The
basic principle, undermining
the integrity of the CEC’s
IT systems and electronic records, paper systems and paper records is
their vague and ambiguous nature. The
systems and records
do not permit the distinction between valid and authentic records and
fake, or fraudulent records (paper or electronic). It is the same
principle, which is also the foundation of the fraud in
in
IT systems and
electronic
records
of the Israeli courts - which
undermines human rights – the
generation of records, whose integrity and validity are vague and
ambiguous.
Such
circumstances in the State of Israel should be considered as a unique
example and extension of the principle,
stated by Harvard law professor Larry Lessig, "Code is Law".
Here
it shows
the consequences of implementing invalid or fraudulent e-government
systems. [xxvii]
Eventually, public trust in
CEC depends on public trust in its chairs. The intention of the law
was that one justice serve a full cycle, from after one general
election till after the next. However, the justices generated high
turnover in the CEC chair position, by appointment of chairs that
were justices before retirement or before appointment as Presiding
Justice of the Supreme Court, leading to their premature resignation
and replacement.
Circumstances,
described above, where Presidency and Plenary CEC meetings (the
meetings
which are
presided by the Chair – Supreme Court Justice) have no lawfully
signed protocols is disturbing. It
should be noted that for other CEC meetings, e.g., Legal Tenders
Committee, Legal Tender Exceptions Committee, lawfully signed
protocols do exist. However,
the failure of the Chairs, Supreme Court justices to produce lawfully
signed CEC protocols is not surprising. The justices also refuse to
produce lawfully signed protocols [“minutes”] for Supreme Court
hearings, even after a special amendment to the law, explicitly
prescribing their duty to do so...
Likewise
disturbing are circumstances, where CEC fails to comply with FOIA,
and FOIA responses are provided only after pre-litigation
notices are forwarded to the Chair – Justice Hanan Melcer.
It
should also be noted that direct notices have been sent to Justice
Hanan Melcer, reporting the various failures, discovered through FOIA
responses, and he has been repeatedly asked to initiate corrective
actions. As documented in a later FOIA response,
CEC answered that no corrective actions have been taken.
The
circumstances, which are documented here, relative to CEC, should be
viewed in the larger context: The April 2019 general election was
conducted with the ruling party’s leader, Prime Minister Netanyahu
facing 3 indictments on various corruption affairs. In fact, analysts
and political figures have repeatedly stated that the reason for the
early scheduling the April 2019 election was to delay or prevent the
filing of the indictments against Netanyahu.
The
failure to establish a governing coalition following the April 2019
election, the immediate calling of another general election in
September 2019, and conduct
of the interim government under dubious authority, are
also viewed as part of the same effort to undermine the
administration of justice
on Netanyahu.
The situation as a whole is
often described as a
“constitutional crisis” (in a nation with no constitution). [xxviii]
Such
crisis has deep roots in corruption
of the justice system and the
failure to enforce the law on Netanyahu for over 20 years, under
patronage of the Attorney General and the Supreme Court. A good
landmark for a starting point
is the 1997 “Bar-On Hebron Affair”, where Netanyahu and his
colleagues were caught selling the office of Attorney General. Police
investigation concluded that they should be indicted, but the case
was closed with no accountability, effectively establishing
Netanyahu’s impunity. [xxix]
Also
in
the US, the validation, security, validity
and regulation of election
IT
systems, particularly e-voting machines, has been a perennial
problem. Over the past 2-3 decades, both computing and legal experts
have repeatedly demonstrated the susceptibility of existing systems
and called for corrective government actions, which failed to follow.
[xxx]
It
should be noted that during this period, the contentious 2000
Bush-Gore election took place, where the failure of machinery for
ballot counting was a critical issue. Outcome of the election was
determined by the US Supreme Court, in what was opined by experts a
notorious decision of historic proportions.
[xxxi]
Two
final conclusions
can be drawn from this case study: Under
circumstances where the political and justice systems are corrupt,
one cannot expect integrity of e-government systems. On the contrary,
under such circumstances e-government systems are easily amenable and
likely to be manipulated as instruments
of fraud by the regime on the people. Particularly for such reasons,
IT
experts should
assume
a key
role in
the safeguard of human
rights,
democratic
institutions,
and civil
society
in
the digital
era.
Online appendix
Expanded text and links to references can be viewed in the online appendix:
References
i
Zernik,
J. (2015) Fraudulent
New IT Systems of the Israeli Courts – Unannounced Regime Change?
ECEG, pp331-340
Zernik,
J. (2017) E-government
in Israel – transformation into the post-truth era, ECDG,
pp 270-279
Zernik,
J. (2018) E-courts
in Israel: Are
judges permitted to deceive in
imprisonment?
ECDG,
pp
257-266
ii
UN Human Rights Council, (2018) Report of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 2018 State of
Israel Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
iii
Lis,
Jonathan (2019) Unusual
voting data in part of the ballot stations; Central Election
Committee: We erroneously entered 2015 data, Haaretz
iv
Kaizler-Inbar (2019) PR firm April 10, 2019 Facebook post, Facebook
v
Landau, N. (2019) PR Firm Behind Likud's Hidden Cameras in Arab
Polling Sites Boasts of Lowering Voter Turnout, Haaretz
vi
Levinson, Ch. (2019) Netanyahu's party places 1200 hidden cameras in
Arab polling sites, Haaretz
vii
Peysahov, G. (2019) “Likud gave me this instrument. I didn’t
think it was a camera. I don’t know anthing”, HaMakom
viii
Israeli
Democracy Institute (2019)
“Fake
election” - round table discussion, Youtube
ix
Caspit, B. (2018) Cyber attacks increasingly penetrating Israel’s
politics, Al-Monitor
x
2015-03-17 Haaretz, Netanyahu Facebook video ''Right wing gov't in
danger Arabs voting in droves'', Youtube
xi
Mazzetti,M. (2018) Rick Gates Sought Online Manipulation Plans From
Israeli Intelligence Firm for Trump Campaign, NYT
Goggin, B. (2019) A company run by former Israeli spies reportedly
tried to influence a local US election — and courted Trump's
campaign, Business Insider
Entous, A, Farrow R. (2019) Private Mossad for hire, New Yorker
Bertrand, N. (2019) Senate Intelligence Committee summons mysterious
British security consultant, Politico
xii
AntAC (2019) Private Israeli intelligence was preparing attacks on
AntAC in 2017 — investigation, antac.org.au
AntAC (2019) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION CENTRE: Attacks on AntAC
Psy Group ran 2017 operation against anti-corruption activists in
Ukraine, Forensic News
xiii
Megiddo, G. (2019) Israel
Seeks to Erase Archives of Intel Firm Psy-Group Employed in anti-BDS
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