2026-04-26
נט המשפט והבינה המלאכותית הסינית (DeepSeek)
הגשות למועצת זכויות האדם של האו"ם ומאמרים בכתבי עת אקדמיים מפרי מקלדתי ב-15 השנים האחרונות, כללו ביקורת נוקבת של מערכת המשפט בישראל, במיוחד על רקע בדיקת תקינות מערכות המידע של בתי המשפט. ההגשה האחרונה למועצת זכויות האדם של האו"ם סוכמה בדו"ח הסופי על ישראל לשנת 2018 בפסקה קצרה, שהסתיימה בעמדה: "יושרתו ותקפותו של כל מסמך חוקי ומשפטי מישראל מפוקפקות במקרה הטוב". במאמרים לכתבי עת אקדמיים ובכנסים בינלאומיים תיארתי את נט המשפט כ"שינוי שיטת משטר בלתי מוכרז". או בקיצור - "הפיכה משטרית". יחד עם זאת, מפעם לפעם תהיתי, האם לא שפטתי את מערכת המשפט בישראל בחומרה רבה מדי. דודי ז"ל, פרופ' אלי שמיר, היה בעל הדעה המשפיע עליי בתחום. הוא ראה בחומרה רבה את חוסר היושרה בנט המשפט, אבל התייחס לעניין בהקשר של התרבות השלטונית בישראל. באותה צורה ראה את חוסר היושרה בנתוני התקציב בדיונים עם האוצר על תקציב בריאות הנפש.
הבינה המלאכותית סיפקה משוב נוסף. DeepSeek הסיני רואה את המצב בחומרה רבה יותר עוד ממני. להלן - עמדתו של Chat GPT האמריקאי.
בדפדפן:https://human-rights-alert.blogspot.com/2026/04/2026-04-26-chat-gpt-net-hamishpat-and.html
.
.
2026-04-26
Western courts’ CMSes, the Israeli CMS, "Net-Hamishpat", and the US
Chat GPT
The series of questions and answers with Chat GPT, copied below, reviews the subject of court CMSes in
general, and the Israeli court CMS, "Net-Hamishpat", in particular. Analysis of the findings by the
Chinese AI tool, DeepSeek, is provided in the previous blog post.
In browser:
1. Court Case Management System Specifications
What are considered the required specifications of a case management system for the courts?
In most jurisdictions, there is no single binding “universal” specification, but a fairly stable set of
functional, technical, and legal requirements has emerged—especially in systems like the U.S.
federal courts’ CM/ECF and international guidance from bodies such as National Center for State
Courts and European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice.
Below is a concise, structured synthesis (with emphasis on issues you’ve been focusing on—
authentication and integrity).
1. Core Functional Requirements
A. Case Lifecycle Management
Case initiation (filing, indexing, docket number generation)
Assignment (judge, panel, clerk)
Event tracking (hearings, motions, orders)
Disposition and archiving
👉 Must maintain a complete, chronological docket (no hidden or mutable entries without trace).
B. Document Management
Filing (electronic + scanned paper)
Version control
Linking documents to docket events
Retrieval (searchable by parties, dates, metadata)
👉 Critical: immutable record or full audit trail of changes
C. Workflow Automation
Routing to judges/clerk
Deadlines and scheduling
Notifications (service, summons, decisions)
D. Public Access Layer
Public docket access (subject to confidentiality rules)
Redaction mechanisms
Distinction between:
public record
sealed record
restricted access
2. Authentication & Legal Validity (central issue)
A. Judicial Authentication
Verifiable indication that:
a judge issued the decision
at a specific time
Methods:
digital signatures (PKI)
secure login attribution (as in CM/ECF “/s/ Judge Name” convention)
👉 Key legal requirement:
The record must be “authentic, valid, and effectual” (terminology rooted in common law and
B. Clerk Authentication
Certification of docket entries
Control over issuance (summons, writs)
👉 Institutional principle:
Separation (or traceable interaction) between judge authority and clerk authority
C. Integrity Guarantees
Protection against:
backdating
silent modification
deletion without record
Required mechanisms:
hash-based integrity
audit logs (non-repudiable)
time-stamping
3. Auditability & Traceability
This is where many systems fail in practice.
Minimum requirements:
Full audit log:
who accessed
who modified
when
Logs must be:
tamper-evident
independently reviewable
👉 Without this, the system cannot rebut or support:
presumption of regularity
allegations of judicial fraud
4. Procedural Compliance Layer
System must enforce (or at least reflect):
Rules of civil/criminal procedure
Proper issuance of summons
Proper service tracking
Deadlines and jurisdictional triggers
Example:
In U.S. federal courts, compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is embedded in
5. Security Requirements
A. Access Control
Role-based (judge, clerk, attorney, public)
Multi-factor authentication
B. Data Protection
Encryption (at rest and in transit)
Backup and disaster recovery
6. Interoperability
Integration with:
law enforcement
prosecution systems
prison systems
Standardized formats (XML, APIs)
7. Transparency vs Confidentiality Balance
System must support:
open justice (public access)
privacy (sealed, juvenile, family cases)
👉 Requires:
fine-grained access control
clear labeling of record status
8. Evidentiary Reliability
A properly designed system should allow a record to function as:
self-authenticating evidence
admissible without additional proof
This connects to doctrines like:
best evidence rule
official records exception
9. Governance & Oversight
Defined authority:
who controls the system?
judiciary vs administration
External audit capability
Documentation of system design and changes
10. Known Failure Modes (comparative insight)
Across jurisdictions, recurring defects include:
Lack of true digital signatures (only “appearance” of signature)
Hidden back-end edits to docket
No public verification mechanism
Clerk/judge role ambiguity
Inadequate audit logs
👉 These defects undermine:
due process
public trust
enforceability of judgments
Bottom line (distilled)
A legally valid court case management system must guarantee:
Authenticity – who issued what
Integrity – record cannot be altered silently
Traceability – full audit trail
Procedural fidelity – reflects binding legal rules
Transparency (controlled) – public oversight with lawful limits
If any of these fail, the system risks producing records that are administratively convenient but
legally defective.
If you want, next step I can:
map these requirements directly against Net HaMishpat (Israel)
or build a litigation-ready checklist for attacking defective records in court (aligned with your
2. When you compare court CMS in Western nations, do they all have clearly defined
"docket"? What are the specifications of such dockets?
Short answer: No—“docket” is universal in function, but not always clearly defined in law or
system design.
In well-developed systems it is explicitly structured; in others it exists de facto but with weaker formal
specification.
1. Is the “docket” universally defined?
A. Common law jurisdictions (U.S., UK, Canada)
The docket is explicit and central
In the U.S., under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the clerk must maintain a civil docket
Implemented concretely in CM/ECF
👉 Here, the docket is:
a formal legal record
presumptively accurate
often treated as authoritative evidence of proceedings
B. Civil law systems (continental Europe)
Equivalent exists (register, case log), but:
terminology varies
legal status is often less explicitly theorized
Guidance from European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice encourages structured case
👉 Functionally similar, but:
sometimes more administrative than evidentiary
C. Mixed / transitional systems (including Israel)
A docket clearly exists in practice (e.g., Net HaMishpat)
But:
normative definition is often weak or fragmented
authenticity and completeness may not be fully regulated
👉 This gap is exactly where disputes about record integrity arise.
2. Core specifications of a legally valid docket
Across systems, a “proper” docket converges on the following specifications:
A. Chronological integrity (non-negotiable)
Sequential record of all case events:
filings
orders
hearings
service
Requirements:
time-stamped entries
no retroactive insertion without trace
👉 This is the backbone of:
procedural fairness
appellate review
B. Completeness
The docket must reflect everything material to the case, including:
all filings received
all decisions issued
all procedural steps
👉 Omission of entries = potential jurisdictional defect
C. Immutability (or traceable change)
Two acceptable models:
Strict immutability (append-only)
Editable but with:
full audit trail
visible corrections
👉 Silent alteration = fatal defect in high-integrity systems
D. Attribution (who did what)
Each entry must identify:
filer (party/attorney/clerk)
issuing authority (judge/clerk)
system actor (user ID)
👉 Without attribution:
no accountability
no authentication
E. Linkage to documents
Each docket entry must:
link to the underlying document
ensure consistency between:
docket text
actual filed/issued record
F. Public accessibility (subject to limits)
Public docket = core element of open justice
Must allow:
inspection
copying (with restrictions where lawful)
G. Legal status as an “official record”
In robust systems, the docket is:
self-authenticating
admissible as evidence of proceedings
Example:
U.S. courts treat clerk-certified dockets as official records
3. Advanced specifications (often missing in practice)
A. Audit layer
Full log of:
additions
edits
deletions
Must be:
tamper-evident
independently reviewable
B. Version control
Historical versions of entries preserved
Clear marking of:
corrections
vacated entries
C. Event classification
Each entry categorized (standard taxonomy), e.g.:
complaint
motion
order
judgment
notice of service
👉 Enables:
automation
analytics
procedural validation
D. Time integrity
Reliable timestamping (preferably secure time source)
Prevention of:
backdating
forward-dating
E. Separation of authorities
Clerk entries vs judicial entries distinguishable
Issuance authority clear:
who created the legal effect?
4. Failure patterns (comparative)
Even in Western systems, defects appear:
In stronger systems (e.g., U.S.)
Docket is reliable, but:
“/s/ Judge” signatures raise authentication questions
backend logs not always publicly accessible
In weaker implementations
Missing entries
Backdated entries
No visible audit trail
Ambiguous authorship (judge vs clerk vs system)
👉 These undermine:
due process
enforceability of judgments
5. Conceptual definition (useful for litigation)
A rigorous definition you can use:
A docket is the authoritative, chronological, and complete register of all procedural and adjudicative acts in a case, maintained under the authority of the court, whose integrity and authenticity must be independently verifiable.
Bottom line
All Western court systems have a docket in substance
Only some have a fully specified, legally robust docket
The critical dividing line is not existence—but:
integrity
auditability
authentication
If you want, next step I can:
Compare this spec directly to Net HaMishpat (point-by-point defects)
Or draft a legal argument framing defective docketing as a denial of due process (U.S./Israeli
3. When you compare court CMS in Western nations, do they all have clearly defined
List of Motions, separate from the "Docket"? What are the specifications of such Lists
of Motions?
Short answer: No.
A formally defined, separate “List of Motions” is not universal across Western court CMS. What is
universal is that motions are recorded and tracked—but usually within the docket, not as an
independent, legally defined register.
1. Comparative structure
A. United States (most structured model)
In systems like CM/ECF:
Motions are:
filed as docket entries
tagged by event type (“motion”, “response”, “order”)
The system can generate motion reports/queues, but:
👉 There is no separate, legally defined “List of Motions” in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The controlling legal record remains the docket (Rule 79)
In practice:
Judges and clerks use internal “pending motions reports.”
These are administrative views, not authoritative records
B. United Kingdom
Similar structure:
Applications (motions equivalent) appear in the case record
Case management systems (e.g., CE-File) may show:
“applications pending”
But again:
👉 No formally independent legal “motions list”
The case file/docket equivalent is controlling
C. Civil law Europe
Systems guided by European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
Motions/applications:
tracked as procedural steps in the case register
Sometimes:
internal “task lists” or “workflow queues” exist
👉 These are:
managerial tools, not formal legal records
D. Israel (Net HaMishpat context)
In practice:
motions (“בקשות”) can be filtered or listed
But:
👉 Typically:
not defined in primary legislation as a separate authoritative register
derived from the underlying docket/events table
2. Why a separate “List of Motions” is rare
Because legally, the system must preserve:
A. Unity of the record
The docket = single authoritative chronology
Splitting into parallel רשימות (lists) risks:
inconsistency
selective visibility
B. Evidentiary reliability
Only one record can be:
certified
relied upon in appeal
👉 Auxiliary lists are usually non-evidentiary
C. Procedural logic
Motions are not standalone:
they are part of a sequence:
filing → response → decision
👉 The docket preserves that sequence; a list does not.
3. When “Lists of Motions” do exist (de facto)
They appear as derived views, not primary records:
Types:
Pending motions list
Motions under advisement
Motions by category (discovery, dispositive, etc.)
Users:
judges (case management)
clerks (workflow control)
4. Specifications of a proper List of Motions (if implemented)
If a system exposes such a list, a robust specification would require:
A. Derivation from the docket
Every item must:
map to a docket entry ID
No مستقل (independent) entries allowed
B. Status tracking
Each motion must have clear states:
filed
served
fully briefed
under consideration
decided
withdrawn / struck
C. Bidirectional linkage
From list → docket entry
From docket → motion status
👉 Prevents divergence
D. Temporal attributes
filing date
last activity date
decision date
E. Responsible actor
filing party
assigned judge
F. Outcome integrity
decision must link to:
specific order/judgment
no “orphan decisions”
G. Auditability
inclusion/exclusion in the list must be traceable
changes in status logged
5. Critical risk (your line of inquiry)
A “List of Motions” becomes problematic when it is:
not transparently derived from the docket
or more complete than the visible docket
👉 Then it can function as a shadow record
This creates risks of:
undisclosed filings
hidden decisions
procedural manipulation
6. Key distinction (important for argument)
You can frame it this way:
Docket = authoritative legal record
List of Motions = administrative projection (legitimate only if fully derived and consistent)
Bottom line
Western systems do not generally define a separate, authoritative “List of Motions”
Where such lists exist, they are:
derived views
non-authoritative
The legal system depends on:
one unified, auditable docket
If you want, I can next:
map how a non-derived motions list could support a claim of hidden proceedings
or formulate this into a tight evidentiary argument (U.S./Israel comparative framing).
4. When you compare court CMS in Western nations, do they all have User Manuals
for the general public, which provide detailed information for the general user, but
also defines the way court staff and judges interact with the system (authorities and
permissions).
Short answer: No.
Most Western court CMS publish user-facing manuals, but they do not fully disclose how judges and
court staff operate the system (roles, permissions, backend functions). That layer is usually partially
documented or internal-only.
1. What is typically published
A. Public / external user manuals
Systems like CM/ECF provide:
Filing instructions (attorneys)
Public access guidance (PACER users)
Basic workflow:
how to file a motion
how to view docket entries
how notices are generated
Often supported by materials from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and training resources via
National Center for State Courts.
👉 These manuals are:
detailed for external users
focused on interaction, not system authority
B. Public policy-level documentation
Some jurisdictions (including guidance from European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice)
publish:
high-level principles:
transparency
access control
data protection
👉 But:
not system-level specifications
2. What is usually not published
A. Full role/permission matrices
Who can:
create docket entries
modify entries
delete or seal records
alter timestamps
👉 These are typically:
internal documentation
sometimes not formally disclosed at all
B. Judge–clerk interaction rules (system-level)
Whether:
a clerk can enter orders on behalf of a judge
a judge can edit prior entries
How authority is technically enforced vs. procedurally assumed
👉 This is critical but often opaque
C. Audit log structure and access
Existence of logs may be acknowledged
But:
schema
accessibility
immutability guarantees
are rarely public
D. Exception handling
Corrections, backdating, voiding entries
Emergency or “off-docket” actions
👉 Typically undocumented for the public
3. Comparative picture
United States
Strongest publication culture:
extensive CM/ECF manuals
Still:
internal operations manuals are separate
not publicly comprehensive
United Kingdom
Public guidance for systems like CE-File
Internal judicial/staff protocols:
not fully disclosed
Civil law Europe
Even less granular public documentation
Emphasis on:
administrative guidance
not technical transparency
Israel (Net HaMishpat context)
Public-facing guidance exists
But:
system authority structure is not fully specified publicly
gaps between:
normative law
actual system behavior
4. Why full manuals are not published
Courts typically justify this on:
A. Security grounds
Prevent misuse or gaming of the system
B. Institutional tradition
Courts regulate themselves internally
C. Complexity
Systems evolve; documentation lags
5. The structural problem (your line of inquiry)
From a rule-of-law perspective, this creates a core tension:
A system that produces legally binding records should have:
defined authority
verifiable permissions
transparent procedures
But in practice:
👉 The public sees:
how to use the system
👉 The public does not see:
how the system exercises judicial power
6. Analytical formulation (useful for argument)
You can frame it as:
In most Western court CMS, documentation is asymmetric:
external interaction is documented
internal authority is not fully specified or publicly verifiable
7. Minimum specifications that should exist (even if unpublished)
A properly governed system must internally define:
Role hierarchy (judge, clerk, admin)
Permission matrix (create/edit/delete)
Authentication mechanisms
Audit logging rules
Exception procedures
👉 If these are:
undefined
inconsistently implemented
or undisclosed
then the system risks:
non-transparent exercise of judicial authority
Bottom line
Yes: most systems have public user manuals
No: they do not fully define or disclose:
judicial/staff powers
backend permissions
audit mechanisms
👉 The gap between user documentation and authority specification is systemic—and legally
significant.
If you want, I can next:
outline what a legally sufficient “full transparency CMS manual” would look like
or map this gap into a due process / administrative law argument (Israel + U.S. comparison).
5. When you compare court CMS in Western nations, do they all have an Audit
Trail? i.e., for each docket entry, are there initials for the staff member who entered
the docket entry?
Short answer: No.
Western court CMSes generally have audit trails, but they do not uniformly expose
them, and they do not rely on simple “initials per docket entry” as the defining feature.
1. Do all systems have an audit trail?
A. In principle — yes
Modern systems (e.g., CM/ECF and comparable European systems) are designed with:
user identification (login-based)
event logging (who did what, when)
internal audit logs
Guidance bodies like the National Center for State Courts and the European Commission for the
Efficiency of Justice treat auditability as a baseline requirement.
👉 So: audit trails almost always exist internally.
B. In practice — visibility varies
Audit logs are typically:
not public
sometimes not even accessible to litigants upon request
Courts often treat them as:
internal administrative data
2. Are “initials on docket entries” standard?
A. Older / paper-based systems
Clerks often added:
initials or signatures
This served as:
visible attribution
B. Modern electronic systems
Attribution is usually:
implicit via login credentials
Docket entries may show:
clerk name
office designation
or nothing beyond the entry itself
👉 Initials are:
not required
often absent
3. What actually constitutes a proper audit trail today
A robust system includes:
A. Identity layer
Unique user ID (not just initials)
Role classification (clerk, judge, admin)
B. Event logging
For every action:
create entry
modify entry
delete/void entry
access/view (in stronger systems)
C. Timestamp integrity
precise time of action
protected against manipulation
D. Change history
before/after values
reason for change (in well-designed systems)
E. Tamper resistance
logs protected from alteration
ideally:
append-only
cryptographically secured
4. Critical distinction (often overlooked)
Docket attribution ≠ audit trail
A docket entry showing:
“entered by clerk X”
is not a full audit trail
A true audit trail is:
separate
complete
non-editable
5. Comparative weaknesses
Even in advanced systems (e.g., U.S.)
CM/ECF:
tracks user actions internally
but:
public docket does not expose full audit history
limited visibility of who edited what
In weaker implementations
No visible attribution
No accessible logs
Possible:
silent edits
backdating
👉 These create evidentiary and due process concerns
6. Legal significance
From a rule-of-law perspective:
An adequate system should allow:
identification of the actor behind each entry
reconstruction of the full history of the record
If not:
👉 It becomes difficult to:
challenge irregularities
rebut presumption of regularity
prove fabrication or alteration
7. Analytical formulation (useful for your work)
You can frame it like this:
Western court CMS generally maintain internal audit trails, but these are not equivalent to, nor replaced by, visible attribution on the docket, and are often not accessible or independently verifiable by litigants or the public.
Bottom line
Audit trails: almost always exist internally
Public attribution (initials/names): inconsistent and often minimal
Full transparency of audit logs: rare
👉 The key issue is not existence—but:
accessibility
integrity
verifiability
If you want, I can next:
outline what an evidentiary-grade audit trail must include to withstand judicial scrutiny
or compare this directly to Net HaMishpat’s known behavior in terms of audit visibility.
6. When you compare court CMSes in Western nations, what are the ways they
addressed the signatures of judges and clerks on judicial records?
Short answer: There is no single model. Western court CMSes converged on a few different ways to
replace handwritten signatures with varying levels of legal robustness and verifiability.
1. Three main models of “signature” in court CMS
A. Full digital signatures (PKI-based) — strongest model
Used in parts of Europe and some national systems.
Features:
Cryptographic signature tied to:
the judge/clerk identity
the exact document content
Verifiable independently (certificate chain)
Typical legal basis:
eID frameworks (e.g., EU qualified electronic signatures)
Guidance influenced by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice.
Strengths:
High integrity (tamper-evident)
Non-repudiation
Independent verification possible
Weaknesses:
Operational complexity
certificate management burden
B. System-authenticated signatures (“login = signature”) — dominant in the U.S.
Implemented in systems like CM/ECF.
Typical form:
“/s/ Judge Name”
“/s/ Clerk Name”
How it works:
A document is considered signed if:
it is entered by an authorized user
through a secure login
Authorized under rules tied to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and local court rules.
Strengths:
Simple
scalable
integrated with workflow
Weaknesses (critical):
No independent cryptographic verification
authenticity depends on:
system integrity
access control
difficult to prove:
whether a specific judge actually reviewed/signed
C. Hybrid / scanned signature models — transitional
Still used in some courts:
Forms:
scanned handwritten signature
stamped signature image
PDF with visual signature layer
Strengths:
visually familiar
Weaknesses:
easily forged
not inherently verifiable
often legally weak without additional controls
2. Clerk signatures vs judge signatures
A. Clerk authentication
Often more formalized:
certification of records
issuance of summons, writs
In stronger systems:
clerk acts as custodian of the record
B. Judicial signatures
More variable:
sometimes formal (PKI)
often implicit (login-based)
👉 This asymmetry is important:
clerks authenticate the record
judges authenticate the decision
But in many CMSes, both are reduced to system events
3. What is actually being “signed”?
Across systems, three distinct things may be confused:
1. The document (PDF/order)
2. The docket entry
3. The act of issuance
Different systems attach “signature” to different layers.
👉 In CM/ECF:
the act of filing/entry is effectively the signature
👉 In PKI systems:
the document itself is signed
4. Verification models
Strong model (PKI)
Anyone can verify:
signature validity
signer identity
document integrity
Weak model (system trust)
Verification requires:
trusting the CMS
trusting internal logs
👉 No independent check
5. Known systemic gaps
Across Western systems:
A. Lack of independent verification
Especially in login-based systems
B. Ambiguity of authorship
Was the judge the actual actor?
Or a clerk entering on their behalf?
C. Separation issues
Clerk may technically perform actions attributed to judge
D. Absence of public validation tools
No way for litigants to:
validate signatures
detect alteration
6. Legal consequences
These design choices affect:
admissibility of records
enforceability of judgments
ability to challenge authenticity
They intersect with doctrines like:
best evidence rule
due process
official records presumption
7. Analytical formulation (useful for your work)
You can frame the issue like this:
Western court CMSes replaced handwritten signatures with either cryptographic signatures or system-authenticated actions; however, in many systems—especially login-based ones—the “signature” is not independently verifiable and depends entirely on institutional trust in the system.
Bottom line
No uniform approach across Western nations
Three models:
PKI digital signature (strong, verifiable)
Login-based signature (dominant, weaker)
Scanned/visual signature (weakest)
👉 The key dividing line is:
independent verifiability vs institutional trust
If you want, next step I can:
connect this directly to Full Faith and Credit / authentication doctrine (U.S.)
or map the gap into a targeted evidentiary challenge strategy for questionable court records.
7. When you compare court CMS in Western nations, can judges or clerks remove records from the docket without due process and notice to parties?
Short answer: Formally, no. Practically, it depends on system design and controls.
1. The formal legal rule (across Western systems)
In all Western jurisdictions:
The docket (or equivalent register) is the authoritative record of proceedings
Court records cannot be removed or altered without legal authority and procedural safeguards
Examples:
In the U.S., under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (esp. Rule 79 and related provisions), the
European guidance (e.g., European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice) emphasizes
👉 Therefore:
Removal or concealment without notice and authority would generally violate:
due process
open justice principles
2. What is allowed (legitimate mechanisms)
Courts do have lawful ways to change the visible record:
A. Sealing / restriction
Record remains in the system
Access limited (e.g., privacy, security)
B. Striking or vacating
Entry remains, but:
marked as “stricken”, “vacated”, or “terminated”
C. Correction of clerical errors
Allowed, but typically:
documented
traceable
sometimes accompanied by notice
D. Expungement (rare in civil context)
Usually requires:
explicit legal authority
formal process
👉 Key point:
The historical trace is normally preserved
3. System design vs legal theory
Here is the critical gap.
A. In well-controlled systems (e.g., CM/ECF)
Docket is effectively append-only
Corrections appear as new entries
Internal logs track changes
👉 Silent deletion is structurally difficult, though not impossible
B. In weaker or opaque systems
Possible risks:
Entries can be:
hidden
removed from public view
altered without visible trace
Especially where:
audit logs are not accessible
permissions are not transparent
4. The key distinction
Legal removal vs technical removal
Legal removal:
authorized
documented
reviewable
Technical removal:
system-level deletion or suppression
may leave no visible trace
👉 The law regulates the first
👉 The CMS design determines whether the second is possible
5. Known failure modes (comparative)
Across jurisdictions, concerns arise where:
Docket entries disappear without:
“stricken” notation
replacement entry
Documents exist but are:
not listed on the docket
Parallel “internal” records differ from public docket
👉 These situations raise:
due process concerns
questions about authenticity of the record
6. What due process requires (minimum standard)
A legally sound system should ensure:
No silent deletion
Every change is recorded
Notice to parties for material changes
Ability to reconstruct the full history
7. Analytical formulation (useful for argument)
You can frame it like this:
While Western legal systems prohibit removal of docketed records without due process, the extent to which such removal is technically prevented—or detectable—depends on the design and transparency of the court’s case management system.
Bottom line
Normatively: removal without due process is not allowed anywhere
Technically: some systems better prevent or expose it than others
Practically: the risk exists where:
auditability is weak
transparency is limited
👉 The decisive factor is not the law—but whether the CMS enforces it.
If you want, I can next:
turn this into a tight legal claim (Israeli + U.S. comparative)
or list specific indicators that a docket has been improperly altered (for evidentiary use).
8. When you compare court CMSes in Western nations, can you say how unusual
these specifications are? I am describing the Israeli CMS – Net HaMishpat.
(1) A judicial record (decision, judgment, hearing protocol) is deemed invalid, lacking
force and effect in any way, unless it is signed by the judge. However, there is no way
for parties, counsel, and the public to determine which decisions, judgments, and
hearing protocols are indeed signed.
Short answer: This is highly unusual—and in strong systems, unacceptable.
A rule that a judgment is valid only if signed, combined with the absence of any way to verify the
signature, departs from standard practice in most Western court CMS.
1. The baseline in Western systems
Across models, two elements normally coexist:
(A) A legal requirement of authentication
Judicial acts must be “signed” or otherwise authenticated
(B) A verifiable manifestation of that authentication
The system provides some way—direct or indirect—to determine that authentication occurred
👉 The key is: not just existence of signature, but verifiability
2. How other systems handle this
A. U.S. (dominant “login = signature” model)
In CM/ECF:
Orders show:
“/s/ Judge Name”
Entry occurs through a judge’s (or authorized user’s) account under rules tied to Federal Rules of
👉 While not cryptographically strong:
There is at least a visible indicium of signature
The docket + notice of electronic filing (NEF) function as evidence of issuance
⚠️ Weakness: no independent verification
✔️ But: parties can tell which documents are “signed”
B. Europe (PKI / e-signature models)
Many systems use:
digital certificates
A document may include:
verifiable signature metadata
👉 Stronger model:
independent verification is possible
C. General minimum standard
Even in weaker systems, one typically finds at least one of:
visible signature mark
certificate metadata
docket notation indicating issuance by judge
3. What makes the situation you describe unusual
You describe a combination of:
Strict legal requirement:
unsigned decision = void / without effect
No observable indicator of signature
No verification mechanism for parties or public
👉 This creates a structural inconsistency:
A condition of validity exists—but is not externally testable
4. Why this is problematic (comparatively)
A. Breaks the authentication function
Authentication must allow:
identification of the author
confirmation of intent to issue
If parties cannot verify the signature:
authentication becomes purely internal
B. Undermines evidentiary reliability
In other systems:
a litigant can present:
signed order (PKI), or
docket + NEF (U.S.)
Here:
litigant cannot prove:
that the decision was properly executed
C. Weakens due process
A party cannot determine:
whether a binding decision exists
whether appeal deadlines have been triggered
whether enforcement is lawful
D. Creates asymmetry of knowledge
Court (or system operators): can know
Parties/public: cannot verify
👉 This asymmetry is atypical in high-integrity systems
5. How unusual is it?
Comparative scale:
Common:
weak signature (e.g., “/s/ Judge”) but visible
Less common but acceptable:
strong cryptographic signature
Unusual:
signature required but only internally verifiable
Highly unusual (your description):
signature required and not verifiable at all by parties
6. Analytical formulation (tight)
You can frame it like this:
The system imposes a formal requirement of judicial signature as a condition of validity, yet fails to provide any mechanism for parties or the public to verify whether that condition has been satisfied. This disconnect is atypical in Western court CMS and undermines the functional meaning of authentication.
7. Bottom line
Western systems vary in strength of signature technology
But they generally ensure some observable or verifiable indication of authentication
👉 A system where:
signature is legally essential
but not externally verifiable
is out of line with prevailing design principles and raises serious issues of:
transparency
due process
evidentiary reliability
If you want, next step I can:
map this point into a focused legal claim (authentication failure → invalidity)
or compare specifically to U.S. Full Faith and Credit authentication doctrine.
9. When you compare court CMS in Western nations, can you say how unusual these
specifications are? I am describing the Israeli CMS – Net HaMishpat.
(2) A motion, which has been previously docketed in the "Motions List" and
designated an "Action Number" (including that original motion, responses by opposing parties and a judicial decision), may disappear without due process, decision or notice to parties.
Short answer: If accurate, this would be highly unusual—and in well-governed systems,
unacceptable.
A motion (with its responses and a decision) that simply “disappears” from a motions list without a
trace, order, or notice conflicts with core docketing principles in Western court CMS.
1. Baseline across Western systems
In systems like CM/ECF and those guided by European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice:
The docket (or case register) is the authoritative, chronological record
Motions are:
docketed as entries
linked to responses and decisions
Any change in status must be:
visible
traceable
👉 A motion’s lifecycle is expected to remain reconstructible.
2. What normally happens to motions (legitimate scenarios)
A motion can change status, but not vanish silently:
A. Decided
Decision entered on the docket
Motion remains part of history
B. Withdrawn
Party files withdrawal
Docket reflects it
C. Stricken / denied without prejudice
Judicial order issued
Entry remains, marked accordingly
D. Sealed
Content hidden, but:
docket entry typically still visible (often as “sealed”)
👉 In all cases: a trace remains on the docket
3. The key structural rule
In robust systems:
Derived views (like a “Motions List”) must be fully consistent with the docket and cannot suppress historical events without trace.
4. What would make your scenario unusual
You describe:
A motion assigned:
an identifier (“Action Number”)
with filings and a decision
Then:
it disappears from the motions list
with no:
docket notation
order
notice
👉 This raises two possibilities:
A. Benign (design limitation, but still problematic)
The “Motions List” is:
a non-authoritative view
filtered (e.g., shows only “active” motions)
But:
the full record still exists on the docket
✔️ Common
⚠️ Acceptable only if:
criteria are clear
history is recoverable
B. Problematic (what you are suggesting)
The motion:
is not visible in the list
and not reconstructible from the docket
No trace of:
filing
responses
decision
👉 This would be highly irregular
5. Why this is serious (comparatively)
A. Violates completeness of the record
A decided motion is part of the case history
Its disappearance breaks:
chronological integrity
B. Undermines appeal rights
Parties may be unable to:
identify decisions
challenge them timely
C. Breaks auditability
No way to determine:
whether the motion existed
who removed it
when and why
D. Enables “shadow record” risk
Parallel realities:
internal system vs visible record
👉 This is precisely what robust CMS design tries to prevent
6. Comparative assessment (how unusual)
Normal: Motion remains on docket; list views may filter but not erase history
Borderline but explainable: Motion disappears from a list but remains fully traceable on the
Highly unusual: Motion disappears from the list and cannot be traced on the docket
Systemically problematic: No record, no order, no notice → non-reconstructible history
7. Analytical formulation (tight)
You can state:
In Western court CMS, motions may change procedural status, but their existence and disposition remain part of the permanent, auditable docket. The disappearance of a motion and its adjudication without trace, order, or notice would be inconsistent with standard principles of record integrity and due process.
8. Bottom line
A “Motions List” itself is usually non-authoritative
But:
it must be derived from a complete docket
If items can disappear without trace or explanation:
👉 That is not typical of well-specified Western systems and raises serious concerns about:
integrity
transparency
procedural fairness
If you want, I can next:
turn this into a precise evidentiary claim (missing motion = defect in record integrity)
or propose tests to distinguish “filtered view” vs “actual disappearance” in practice.
10. When you compare court CMSes in Western nations, can you say how unusual
these specifications are? I am describing the Israeli CMS – Net HaMishpat.
(3) The List of Motions lists the motions in the court file in a chronological order with
consecutive numbers designated to the Motions. However, about 30% of the ordinal
numbers are missing from the list. The list goes: 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 11... etc. The missing
ordinal numbers are presumably occupied by records that the court does not want the
parties to be able to inspect and copy, only judges and court personnel.
Short answer: As described, this would be highly unusual and difficult to justify in well-governed
Western systems.
Gaps of ~30% in a sequential “Motions List,” without any visible placeholders or explanations,
conflict with the standard requirements of traceability and transparency.
1. Baseline practice
In systems like CM/ECF and guidance from European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice:
Motions are tracked on the authoritative docket (or case register)
Any derived list (e.g., “motions”) must be:
consistent with the docket
reconstructible
When items are restricted:
the existence of the item is still indicated
👉 The norm is: you may hide content, not the fact of its existence.
2. How sealed/restricted items are normally handled
Across jurisdictions:
A. U.S.
Sealed filings typically appear as:
“SEALED DOCUMENT” or similar
They keep:
a docket number
a date
Content is hidden, but the slot is not removed
B. Europe
Registers may:
restrict access
anonymize entries
But usually retain:
visible entries or coded placeholders
3. Why sequential numbering matters
A numbered motions list (1, 2, 3, …) serves:
integrity check (no silent insertions/deletions)
completeness signal
reference system for parties and courts
👉 Missing numbers undermine all three.
4. Interpreting the pattern you describe
Sequence like:
1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 11…
means:
numbers 3–6, 10, etc. are absent
and (per your description) no placeholders or explanations appear
This implies one of two things:
A. Benign but poorly designed (still problematic)
The list is:
a filtered view (e.g., “visible motions only”)
Missing numbers correspond to:
sealed/restricted/internal items
⚠️ But even then, in strong systems:
you would expect:
placeholders
or a note indicating restricted entries
B. Structurally opaque (more serious)
The system:
suppresses both content and existence
Parties cannot know:
how many motions exist
what procedural steps occurred
👉 This is highly irregular
5. Why this is a serious deviation
A. Violates traceability
You cannot reconstruct:
full procedural history
B. Undermines equality of arms
Court/internal users:
see full sequence
Parties:
see partial sequence
👉 Asymmetry of knowledge
Missing numbers could reflect:C. Weakens auditability
sealed items
removed items
reclassified itemsno way to distinguish among themBut:
D. Affects appellate rights
Parties may be unaware of:
filings affecting the case
decisions tied to those filings
6. Comparative assessment
Normal:
Sequential numbering with visible placeholders for restricted itemsLess ideal but acceptable:
clear labeling (“X entries hidden”)
Filtered list, but:Unusual:
Missing numbers with no explanationHighly unusual (your description):
no placeholders
no notice
no reconstruction path
Large proportion (~30%) missing, with:
7. Analytical formulation (tight)
You can frame it as:
A sequentially numbered motions list that omits a substantial portion of ordinal positions without placeholders or explanation obscures the existence of procedural events. In contrast to prevailing Western CMS practices, which preserve the visibility of entries even when content is restricted, such a design impairs traceability, auditability, and the parties’ ability to reconstruct the case record.
8. Bottom line
Western systems allow:
restriction of access to content
They generally do not allow:
silent removal of entries from the visible sequence
👉 A list with systematic, unexplained gaps is not typical and raises significant concerns regarding:
record integrity
transparency
due process
If you want, the next step I can:
formulate this into a precise evidentiary argument (missing ordinals → incomplete record)
or propose practical tests to prove whether the gaps correspond to sealed vs
11. האם תוכל לתמצת בעברית את השיחה שלנו בעניין מערכות ניהול תיקים אלקטרוניים בבתי
המשפט ?
להלן תמצית קצרה וממוקדת של עיקרי השיחה:
1. דרישות יסוד למערכת ניהול תיקים (CMS)
במערכות מערביות (כגון CM/ECF):
יומן (Docket) הוא הרשומה הסמכותית, הכרונולוגית והמלאה של ההליך
נדרשים:
שלמות (אין השמטות)
אי־שינוי ללא עקבות (Audit Trail)
שיוך פעולות למשתמשים (שופט/מזכיר)
נגישות מבוקרת לציבור
2. יומן לעומת “רשימת בקשות”
“רשימת בקשות” אינה רשומה משפטית עצמאית
היא בדרך כלל תצוגה נגזרת מהיומן
לכן:
אסור שתכיל מידע שלא ביומן
ואסור שתסתיר אירועים מהותיים הקיימים ביומן
3. מדריכי משתמש
קיימים מדריכים לציבור (איך להגיש, לצפות וכו’)
אך לרוב אין שקיפות מלאה לגבי:
סמכויות שופטים ומזכירים במערכת
הרשאות שינוי/מחיקה
מבנה לוגים (Audit)
4. Audit Trail (עקיבות)
ברוב המערכות יש לוגים פנימיים
אך:
אינם גלויים לציבור
לא תמיד מאפשרים בדיקה חיצונית
“שם/ראשי תיבות ביומן” ≠ Audit מלא
5. חתימות שופטים ומזכירים
שלושה מודלים:
חתימה קריפטוגרפית (חזק)
חתימה מבוססת מערכת (login = חתימה, כמו ב־CM/ECF)
חתימה סרוקה (חלש)
עיקרון מרכזי:
👉 חייבת להיות דרך כלשהי לוודא את החתימה
6. שינוי או הסרת רשומות
נורמטיבית: אסור למחוק/להעלים רשומות ללא:
סמכות
תיעוד
הודעה לצדדים
בפועל: תלוי בתכנון המערכת
מערכת תקינה:
אינה מאפשרת מחיקה שקטה
שומרת היסטוריה מלאה
7. הערכת המאפיינים שתיארת (נט המשפט)
(1) חתימה שאינה ניתנת לאימות
חריג מאוד
דרישת חתימה בלי אפשרות לבדוק אותה → פגם מהותי באותנטיקציה
(2) היעלמות בקשות מרשימת הבקשות
אם אין זכר ביומן:
חריג וחמור
אם רק ברשימה (תצוגה):
ייתכן הסבר טכני, אך עדיין בעייתי אם לא שקוף
(3) דילוגים במספור (כ־30%)
תקין: הסתרת תוכן אך לא עצם קיום הרשומה
לא תקין: מחיקת המספור ללא הסבר
👉 דילוגים ללא סימון = פגיעה ב:
שלמות הרשומה
אפשרות ביקורת
זכויות דיוניות
מסקנה כוללת
הסטנדרט במערכות מערביות:
ניתן להגביל גישה לתוכן — אך לא להסתיר את עצם קיומו של אירוע דיוני, ולא לשלול אפשרות אימות ואיתור.
המאפיינים שתיארת מצביעים (אם מדויקים) על חריגה מסטנדרטים אלה, בעיקר ב:
אותנטיקציה (חתימות)
שלמות הרשומה
שקיפות ואפשרות ביקורת
אם תרצה, אוכל להפוך את התמצית הזו ל־טיעון משפטי מובנה (למשל לעתירה או חוות דעת).
12. Please summarize in English our conversation about the Israeli courts’ CMS –
Net HaMishpat – in comparison to Western systems
Here is a concise English summary of our discussion:
1. Core standards in Western court CMS
In Western systems (e.g., CM/ECF):
The docket is the authoritative, complete, chronological record
Systems are expected to ensure:
completeness (no missing events)
traceability (audit trail)
attribution (who did what)
controlled public access
👉 The guiding principle:
You may restrict access to content—but not conceal the existence of procedural events.
2. Docket vs. “List of Motions”
A List of Motions is typically:
a derived, administrative view
not a legally authoritative record
It must:
fully correspond to the docket
not omit or add independent events
3. Transparency of system design
Western courts provide user manuals for filing and access
But generally do not fully disclose:
internal permissions (judges vs. clerks)
audit log structure
backend controls
👉 There is a systemic gap between:
user-facing documentation
internal authority design
4. Audit trails
Most systems maintain internal audit logs
However:
they are rarely public
docket entries alone do not constitute a full audit trail
5. Judicial and clerk signatures
Three models exist:
Cryptographic digital signatures (strong, verifiable)
System-based signatures (login = signature, common in CM/ECF)
Scanned/visual signatures (weak)
👉 Minimum standard:
There must be some observable or verifiable indication of authentication
6. Alteration or removal of records
Legally, records cannot be removed without:
authority
documentation
notice
In well-designed systems:
no silent deletion
full history is preserved
7. Assessment of the described Net HaMishpat features
(1) Signature required but not verifiable
Highly unusual
A legal requirement of signature without a way to verify it undermines authentication and due
(2) Motions disappearing from the “Motions List”
If only a filtered view → potentially explainable
If not traceable in the docket → highly irregular and serious
(3) Missing sequential numbers (~30%) in the Motions List
Western systems:
may hide content (sealed entries)
but typically preserve visible placeholders
Large unexplained gaps:
undermine completeness
prevent reconstruction of the record
create asymmetry between court and parties
8. Overall conclusion
Compared to Western standards, the described features (if accurate) suggest deviations in:
Authentication (non-verifiable signatures)
Record integrity (missing or non-traceable entries)
Transparency and auditability
👉 Core issue:
Western systems rely on a combination of formal validity and practical verifiability.
A system that preserves formal rules but denies users the ability to verify them raises serious concerns for due process and the rule of law.
If you want, I can next convert this into a formal legal memorandum or affidavit-style analysis.
13. A few additional bits of information about Net-HaMishpat:
(1) Please assess them in comparison to other Western systems,
(2) Please assess to what degree they change your previous summary regarding Net
Hamishpat.
1. I was the author of the 2018 UN UPR submission by Human Rights Alert – NGO for the
UPR of Israel. The submission passed the review by the Professional Staff and was
incorporated into the final UN report as a short paragraph and a link to the full submission
on the UN site.
(a) Please provide a critical review of the 2018 HRA-NGO UPR submission.
(b) To what degree was it different from other UPR-relevant sources of information
about Israel?
(c) To what degree was it different and unique among all UPR reports on all nations over
the years? i.e., in focusing on courts' CMSs.
2. In 2010, Net Hamishpat was implemented in the District and Magistrate Courts. In the
same year, the State Ombudsman published his report regarding the development and
implementation of Net HaMishpat:
(a) The intensive development started in 2003, and apparently, by 2007, a beta version was
working.
(b) The system was developed by outsourcing. However, (i) No legal tender was
conducted, in violation of the law, (ii) Contracts were signed with no specifications, in
violation of the law, (iii) In one place, the Ombudsman writes that there was no core
management by a State Employee, in violation of rules, in another place, he writes that
Director of the Courts Judge Boaz Okon, Chief Justice Aharon Barak’s protege oversaw
the development process, (iv) In the process of development and implementation, servers
for the courts were removed from the custody of the courts and permanently
placed in the custody of corporations, (v) The mandatory independent inspection by state employees
had not been performed prior to implementation in the courts, (vi) The Ombudsman
repeated several times in his report, the comment: "the system was developed without any
representation of the public interest". How unusual is this in Western nations?
3. After implementation – from 2010-2026:
(a) Since its implementation, the system is shrouded in secrecy. The Administration of Courts
refuses to answer simple fundamental questions regarding Net Hamishpat. E.g., in Israeli law,
judgment in a trial for a serious crime (e.g., murder) must be signed by all 3 judges of the panel.
Apparently, in Net HaMishpat, it is signed only by 1 judge (if there are lawful signatures in Net
Hamishpat at all). The Administration of Courts refuses to provide any information on the
subject in FOIA requests, and the Jerusalem District Court and the Supreme Court back the
Administration of Courts in this matter.
(b) Already in 2012, in his report on the Judge Varda Alshech protocol scandal, the
Ombudsman of the Judiciary concluded that many of the Tel-Aviv District Court judges
routinely issue unsigned decisions, judgments, and protocols (whereas the
litigants, counsel, and the public have no way to discover that). In the past, Israeli
Rules of Civil Procedure required that the judges provide written and
signed decisions. Any appeal had to be based on a signed decision and a clearly defined set
of papers. from the case file. However, the Regulations have been changed:
(i) The formal legal requirement for a written, signed decision was deleted, (ii) the
requirement for certification of a signed decision as the basis for the appeal was deleted.
I assume that many appeals are conducted today based on an unsigned and invalid decision
or judgement, (iii) the provision requiring the specific definition of accompanying
papers from the lower court file was deleted. (iv) The court of appeals explained that the
appeal is based on all papers that were before the lower court. It means that the appeal court
is using in its consideration the lower court’s secret papers, which are not accessible to the appellant.
Below is a concise, critical assessment of your additional information, in two layers:
(1) comparison to Western CMS norms, and
(2) how (and whether) it changes the earlier assessment.
1. 2018 HRA–NGO UPR submission
(a) Critical review
Your submission was unusual in that it:
Focused on technical integrity of court CMS (authentication, auditability, record integrity)
substantive rights (detention, discrimination, etc.)
rather than:
Treated CMS design as infrastructure of due process
Strengths:
Conceptually strong: links information systems → human rights
Empirical orientation (audit-type critique)
Identifies risks invisible in traditional legal analysis
Weaknesses (from a UPR perspective):
Highly technical → less accessible to diplomats/policymakers
Relatively limited doctrinal framing (e.g., ICCPR articles)
Harder to corroborate compared to conventional rights reports
(b) Difference from other Israel UPR sources
Most UPR inputs on Israel focus on:
occupation / security issues
minority rights
detention, asylum, etc.
Your submission:
shifted focus to domestic judicial infrastructure
implicitly questioned reliability of the legal system itself
👉 This is substantively different, not just thematically.
(c) Uniqueness across all UPR reports
Across UPR history:
Very few (if any) submissions focus on:
court IT systems as a human rights issue
Your submission is close to unique in:
treating CMS integrity as a systemic due process condition
👉 This is a novel but niche approach, which explains both:
why it passed review (credible)
why it remained marginal (not mainstream framing)
2. 2010 Ombudsman report (development phase)
The findings you list—if taken at face value—are highly irregular by Western standards:
Key issues:
No public tender
No formal specifications
Outsourcing without state control
Conflicting governance descriptions
No independent inspection before deployment
Explicit statement: “no representation of the public interest”
Comparative assessment
In Western jurisdictions:
Court CMS projects typically require:
formal procurement procedures
detailed specifications
documented governance structure
testing/validation before deployment
👉 Deviations do occur—but:
The combination of all these defects in one project is very unusual
Particularly notable:
A. Lack of specifications
This is exceptional
A CMS without specs undermines:
validation
accountability
legal reliability
B. No public-interest representation
In modern governance:
stakeholder/public-interest consideration is standard
Repeated acknowledgment of its absence is striking
C. External custody of servers
Not inherently improper (cloud/outsourcing exists)
But requires:
strict legal and security frameworks
👉 Without them → serious governance concern
3. Post-2010 operation
(a) Secrecy and refusal to disclose
Comparative view:
Western courts:
often limit disclosure
But:
fundamental questions (e.g., signature practices) are usually answerable at least at a
👉 Persistent refusal, backed by courts, is:
Unusual in degree, even if not entirely unique
(b) Unsigned decisions (Alshech report)
If accurate as systemic practice:
This is highly irregular
In all Western systems:
some form of authentication is required
Even where weakened (e.g., CM/ECF):
there is still:
visible attribution
presumptive authentication
👉 Routine issuance of undetectably unsigned decisions would be:
a major deviation
(c) Regulatory changes (removal of safeguards)
You describe removal of:
requirement for signed decisions
requirement for certified record on appeal
requirement to define record on appeal
Comparative assessment:
Western appellate systems require:
a defined record
accessible to both sides
👉 A system where:
appeal may rely on undisclosed materials
and not on a clearly defined record
is:
closer to an inquisitorial/administrative opacity model than to standard rule-of-law design
4. Do these points change the prior assessment?
Short answer: They reinforce and deepen it.
Earlier summary identified concerns in:
authentication
record integrity
transparency
With the new information:
The concerns shift from:
design weaknesses
To:
systemic governance and rule-of-law risks
Specifically:
(1) Signature issue
→ Moves from “unusual” to:
potentially structural invalidity of judicial acts
(2) Missing motions / numbering gaps
→ Moves from:
possible UI/design issue
to:
possible existence of non-transparent parallel records
(3) Auditability and secrecy
→ Moves from:
limited transparency
to:
institutional resistance to verification
(4) Development defects
→ Provide causal background:
lack of specs + oversight → explains current anomalie
5. Overall updated assessment
Compared to Western CMS norms:
Individual issues you describe:
each exists somewhere in milder form
But the combined pattern:
lack of specifications
lack of authentication transparency
missing/opaque records
undefined appellate record
sustained institutional secrecy
is:
Highly unusual in combination
Final formulation
You can frame the overall conclusion as:
While Western court CMS may exhibit isolated weaknesses in authentication, transparency, or auditability, the described features of Net HaMishpat—particularly when combined with documented deficiencies in its development and ongoing opacity—suggest a systemic departure from core principles of verifiable judicial records, traceable procedure, and equality of access to the record.
If you want, next step I can:
convert this into a structured legal memorandum (affidavit-ready)
or map each point to specific due process doctrines (U.S., EU, Israeli law).
14. The Israeli Family Courts are a class by themselves. They are a unique, original
Israeli creation, established in 1995, based on the concept of "Therapeutic Courts". They
employ a large number of social workers, who review the family members and issue reports
on the families. Likewise, they employ attorneys, who serve as counsel for the minors and issue
reports as well. Such reports are often kept confidential. All cases are heard behind closed
doors, with publication prohibited.
Such attributes create a judicial process that differs substantially from contemporary
Western concepts of courts and justice. In a 2016 newspaper report, the correspondence
among leading Israeli experts was leaked. Prof. Daphna Hacker of Tel-Aviv University
provided a scathing description of the Family Courts, where "judges rule arbitrarily with
disregard of the law". She further described them as "informal", "not courts at all",
"there is no justice there", causing "terrible and
frightful harm", and complained that "there is no way to teach family law, since there is
no relationship between the law and what happened in the courts". In a 2023 academic
paper, based on a review of several thousand cases, she described "radical judicial
activism" and "chaos". In 2025, Chair of the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee, an attorney himself, MK S. Rothman, described on the record the Family
Courts as "the black hole of the justice system". Yet, such critics of the Family Courts
avoid describing them as "corrupt". Over the past 2 years, I have had a unique
opportunity to review some Family Court files by joining online groups of divorced
parents. The striking finding was the consistently false data entered in the court files,
particularly regarding party designations and registration of special appointments by
the court, e.g., Social Workers, Legal Guardians, Guardian ad Litem, Estate Administrators,
and Receivers. The false entries (e.g., listing them as Defendants) appear to subvert the
regulation of the Special Appointment holders by specialized agencies, such as
the Administrator General and Official Receiver (similar to the U.S. Trustee, or U.K. Public
Trustee). Furthermore, the false data entries, pertaining to Officers of the Court, appear to
fundamentally undermine the validity of the court process.
In correspondence with the Legal Counsel for the Administration of Courts, I brought up
these findings and contrasted them with the system prior to Net Hamishpat, where the Clerk
of the Court was personally responsible for 'the excellent maintenance of court records and
Books of Court', including, for example, the Book of Special Appointments. The Legal
Counsel’s response was: ‘Net Hamishpat is a computerized information system. The entries
in this or that computerized information system have no bearing on the validity of court
actions. The force and effect of judicial decisions solely depend on being duly signed by the
judges".
Please comment.
This is an extraordinarily significant addition. The information about the Family Courts, combined
with the Legal Counsel's formal response, provides the missing piece that connects the technical
anomalies of Net HaMishpat to a coherent institutional philosophy. It demands a fundamental
reassessment of the entire system.
Your description raises two distinct but tightly connected issues:
(1) the institutional model of the Family Courts, and
(2) the legal meaning attributed to the CMS (Net HaMishpat) by the Administration of Courts.
I’ll address both, and then the combined implication.
1. Family Courts as a “therapeutic / informal” model
The Family Courts Law, 1995 indeed created a hybrid forum:
combines adjudication with:
social work assessments
guardian/representative reports
proceedings:
in camera
with broad confidentiality
Comparative perspective
Western systems do have analogous elements:
Problem-solving courts (U.S.)
Family / youth courts (UK, EU)
But crucial differences remain:
A. Persistence of legal formalities
Even in “therapeutic” settings:
decisions must be:
attributable
reviewable
record integrity remains:
strictly governed
B. Record reliability is not relaxed
Social worker reports may be confidential
BUT:
their existence is recorded
their role in decisions is reviewable
C. Appellate structure remains anchored in a defined record
Even if proceedings are informal:
appeals rely on a known and accessible record
Your cited critiques (Prof. Daphna Hacker, MK Rothman)
I will not assess the rhetoric itself, but analytically:
They point to:
gap between formal law and practice
perceived loss of rule-based adjudication
👉 This aligns with known tensions in “therapeutic justice” models:
flexibility vs legality
discretion vs predictability
2. The Legal Counsel’s statement
“Entries in the computerized system have no bearing on the validity of court actions. Validity depends solely on judicial signature.”
This is the critical statement.
Comparative assessment
In Western systems:
A. The record is constitutive, not incidental
The docket/case file is:
part of the legal act itself
Errors in the record may:
affect validity
affect appeal rights
B. Signature alone is not sufficient
Even where signature is key:
validity depends on:
proper issuance
proper recording
proper service
👉 A “signed but unrecorded or misrecorded” act is problematic
C. CMS entries are legally significant
In systems like CM/ECF:
docket entries:
trigger deadlines
define procedural posture
they are routinely relied upon as:
official evidence
Therefore:
The statement reflects a model where:
The formal act (signature) is detached from the record system
This is not the prevailing Western approach.
3. Your finding: systematically false entries
You describe:
misclassification of parties
misregistration of court-appointed officers
apparent bypass of regulatory frameworks
If accurate, implications are serious
A. Breakdown of role integrity
Officers of the court must be:
properly identified
properly supervised
Misclassification:
may obscure:
authority
accountability
B. Regulatory evasion risk
If entries prevent linkage to bodies like:
Administrator General / Official Receiver
then:
oversight mechanisms may be impaired
C. Impact on validity
Contrary to the Legal Counsel’s claim:
misidentification in the record can affect:
jurisdiction
authority of actors
enforceability
👉 In Western doctrine, such defects are not trivial
4. The key conceptual divergence
You correctly identify a coherent institutional philosophy:
Model implied by the Legal Counsel:
The CMS is:
merely administrative / technical
The only legally relevant act:
judge’s signature
Western prevailing model:
The CMS (or its paper predecessor) is:
part of the legal infrastructure
Validity depends on:
integrated system of record + authentication + procedure
5. Combined effect (Family Courts + CMS philosophy)
This is where your analysis becomes significant.
You are describing a system where:
Proceedings are:
confidential
informal
heavily discretionary
Records are:
opaque
potentially inconsistent
The official position is:
record integrity is not legally determinative
Comparative conclusion
Individually:
each element exists somewhere in Western systems
Combined:
This configuration is unusual in degree and structure
Because it weakens simultaneously:
transparency
auditability
procedural verifiability
6. Does this justify a “fundamental reassessment”?
Careful formulation:
It strengthens your earlier concerns significantly
It suggests:
not isolated technical flaws
but a system-level divergence in how legality is constructed
However:
Strong claims (e.g., systemic corruption) require:
case-specific proof
documented instances with evidentiary support
7. Tight analytical formulation
You could state:
The Administration’s position that CMS records are legally irrelevant, combined with systemic opacity and informal adjudication in Family Courts, reflects a structural separation between judicial acts and their recorded representation. This departs from prevailing Western models, where the integrity and accessibility of the court record are integral to due process and the validity of judicial proceedings.
Bottom line
The Family Court model alone → not unique, but more discretionary
The CMS philosophy alone → unusual
The combination → structurally atypical in Western comparison
👉 Your new information does not just reinforce earlier concerns—it reframes them as systemic
rather than technical.
If you want, I can next:
translate this into a precise legal theory (invalidity of proceedings due to record unreliability)
or map it to specific doctrines (Israeli administrative law / comparative due process).
